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How to Fix the Google Book
Search Settlement
By James Grimmelmann

T

he proposed settlement in the Google Book Search
case should be approved with strings attached.1 The
project will be immensely good for society, and the
proposed deal is a fair one for Google, for authors,
and for publishers. The public interest demands, however, that the settlement be modified first. It creates two
new entities—the Books Rights Registry Leviathan and
the Google Book Search Behemoth—with dangerously
concentrated power over the publishing industry. Left
unchecked, they could trample on consumers in any
number of ways. We the public have a right to demand
that those entities be subject to healthy, pro-competitive
oversight, and so we should.
After laying out the basics of the proposed settlement agreement and explaining how it will benefit
both the parties to the lawsuit and society more broadly,
I’ll work through the implications of five overriding
principles:
1.

The Registry poses an antitrust threat. The Book
Rights Registry will be a new collecting society
representing the interests of authors and publishers. This kind of collective action poses an obvious
antitrust risk: What if the Registry becomes the
instrument of a cartel to fix the price of books?
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the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States license, http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/.

2.

3.

4.

To keep the Registry from overreaching, we’ll
need more checks than the settlement currently
contains.
Google poses an antitrust threat. By virtue of the
settlement, Google will have the book search market
and the download market for orphan works largely
to itself. The structure of a class action settlement,
in itself, is a highly effective barrier to entry. We’ll
need similar checks on Google’s actions to keep it
from acting anticompetitively in book markets.
Consumers need protection. The settlement as it
stands is often good at ensuring minimum standards
to benefit libraries, institutions, and consumers.
But in some areas, such as price discrimination and
privacy, the settlement leaves the door open for
Google to behave oppressively. We’ll need to close
that door.
Public goods should be widely available. Just by
providing the search and download services and
Continued on page 11
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5.

by processing payments, Google and the Registry
will assemble some immensely useful databases about
book copyright information. These databases are classic public goods, and neither Google nor the Registry
will need exclusive rights over them as an incentive.
We’ll need to make sure that those databases are
made available to the public.
Transparency and accountability matter. If Google
becomes a chokepoint for getting books to the public,
there’s a risk that it could secretly censor. Google, of
course, doesn’t want to distribute books that it strongly disagrees with (or fears legal liability from). These
two goals can be reconciled. We’ll need to make sure
that when Google chooses not to make books available, it leaves open suitable alternative channels for
getting them to the public.

These five principles give rise to a number of specific
recommendations. Each proposed change is incremental
and fully consistent with the settlement’s overall goals
and design.
THE SETTLEMENT
First, a little history. Google Book Search is actually
two related programs. The Partner Program works with
books that it receives from publishers (either physically
or as PDFs). Meanwhile, the Library Project has been
scanning books en masse from the collections of university and civic libraries. Either way, Google folds the
scans into its gigantic Book Search index. Enter a search
term, and Google will show you a list of books containing the term.
What happens when you click on a result depends
on where the book came from. For public-domain books
from the Library Project, you go directly to a page where
you can browse the book online or download a PDF copy.
For books from the Partner Program, Google lets the publisher decide how much users can see. Generous publishers
enable extensive previewing of sample chapters; stingy
publishers allow you to see only a snippet of a few lines
containing the search term; paranoid publishers prohibit
even that.
This leaves open a large middle ground: in-copyright
books from the Library Project. Most of these books are
out of print; many of them are “orphan works” for which
no copyright owner can be found. Google’s policy has
been to make these books searchable and available in
snippets. That may not seem like much, but it’s still more
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than many authors and publishers would like; they see
Google as a trespasser willing to drive through the yards
of people who aren’t at home.
The proposed settlement is complex, but its central
deal is simple. Looking backward, Google will be released
from liability for its scanning, searching, and displaying2
in exchange for a set of one-time payments totaling about
$125 million.3 Looking forward, it will be allowed to
continue scanning and displaying books4 in exchange for
63 percent of its net revenues from the advertising that it
shows on search results and book display pages.5 This deal
is most significant for out-of-print and orphan works: It
effectively lets Google go ahead with making substantial
uses of these works, while holding a share of the revenues
in trust for the copyright owners.
Of course, many of the copyright owners who’ll be
paid as part of the settlement don’t currently have deals
with Google. A new Book Rights Registry will be in
charge of mediating all these relationships.6 It will take
payments from Google and pass them along to the appropriate authors and publishers. In the other direction, it
will communicate to Google copyright owners’ requests
for the levels of access allowed to their books.
The settlement also authorizes some exciting new
programs. An Institutional Subscription system will
allow Google to sell all-you-can-eat digital access to
the entire catalog of scanned books to companies,
colleges, and potentially even individuals.7 A Public
Access Service will provide a restricted version of the
Institutional Subscription to colleges and public libraries for free.8 Meanwhile, a Consumer Purchase system
will allow Google to sell electronic access to complete
individual books.9 Copyright owners can set their sale
price or delegate that decision to Google’s algorithmic
whizzes.10 The revenues from these new programs, along
with other new revenue models worked out by Google
and the Registry, will also flow to copyright owners in
the same 63/37 split.11 A section on “Non-Consumptive
Research” also allows researchers to run gigantic automated statistical studies on the entire corpus of scanned
books.12 Copyright owners won’t be paid for these uses
on the theory that they don’t involve people “reading portions of a Book to understand [its] intellectual
content.”13
Meanwhile, the libraries that have been supplying
books for scanning aren’t actually parties to the lawsuit.
The settlement, however, contains provisions that enable
them to sign agreements with the Registry that effectively
release them from liability.14 Libraries that get back digital copies of their books from Google must agree to keep
those copies secure and limit access;15 libraries that don’t
have few other obligations.16
11
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THE SETTLEMENT SHOULD
B E A P P R OV E D
My starting point is that the settlement is a good
thing. Everyone is better off than they would be in a world
without Google Book Search:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•

Google makes piles of money from selling ads, subscriptions, and e-books.
Authors and publishers get the lion’s share of that
money.
The publishing industry benefits from the incidental
cleanup of copyright records.
Universities, schools, companies, and other institutions can subscribe to Google’s convenient fire hose
of books.
Public and college libraries get free access to the fire
hose.
The libraries participating in scanning books get digital copies of the scanned books from their collections.
Individual readers get an increasingly comprehensive
book search engine.
Readers also get free PDF access to millions upon
millions of public-domain books and two paid-butconvenient digital sources for in-copyright books.
The public as a whole gets a substantial leg up on
solving the orphan-works problem.
Researchers running automated studies can advance
human knowledge on algorithms, natural language,
the history of publishing, and other topics.

These are serious benefits, and the settlement is a
universal win compared with the status quo. Still, some
commentators dislike the settlement because they that
think we’d be even better off if the case proceeded to trial
and judgment. They’d been hoping that Google would
have established that its scanning and searching features
were fair uses. If Google had prevailed on the fair use issue,
it would have opened the book search business to anyone,
free from legal taint. What’s more, it would have given us
a powerful, portable fair use principle that could do a lot of
other good in this digital age. While a definitive finding of
fair use would have been better than the settlement, that’s
not the choice on the table. There are three good reasons
that we should settle for the settlement.
First, there’s no guarantee that Google would have
won on the fair use issue. A finding against fair use,
especially given the possibility that the Supreme Court
would have granted certiorari in such a socially significant case, could have done immense damage to other
large-scale projects making beneficial but incidental uses
of a great many copyrighted works. The settlement is so
12
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comprehensive, however, that it gives us perhaps 80 or 90
percent of the actual uses of books that a positive fair use
finding would have enabled. Those who favor a judicial
showdown on the fair use issue would do better to join
that battle in some other case, one in which the equities
tip more clearly in favor of fair use.
Second, even if scholars and observers would like
a fair use fight, it’s not our call to make. It’s Google’s.
Google was the defendant; it earned that dubious privilege
by actually scanning and searching books. Having stepped
up to the plate to risk a lawsuit, and having been beaned
with one, Google now has the right to choose whether to
settle that suit. Google’s choice to settle takes away no
legal rights from anyone else; one else loses the fair use
argument because Google didn’t chance it.
I’ve seen people raise the argument that Google’s
capitulation means that there’s now a functioning licensing market for searching books. If true, this fact would
undercut fair use claims by Google’s competitors, since
it would imply that scanning and searching without payment take away revenue that copyright holders could have
realized. The critical hole in this argument is that this isn’t
a market that one can effectively negotiate in without the
device of the class-action lawsuit. Even after the settlement, there will still be far too many potential plaintiffs
for any competitor to be able to cleanly license all the
rights that it needs to start large-scale scanning. It’s also
significant that Google won’t pay royalties for scanning or
searching under the settlement; the paid uses only start
once a user clicks through from a search results page to a
page with content from a specific book.17 If the settlement
creates a distinct market for scanning and searching, it’s
a market in which these uses are worthless to copyright
owners.
Third, given that Google and the copyright owners
are the parties here, there’s no way to force the court to
consider the fair use issue. The adversarial legal process
allows parties to present their cases and controversies to a
judge for resolution. It doesn’t generally allow outsiders to
compel the parties to litigate issues not of their choosing.
This fact means that, to the extent that the rest of us want
the court to modify the settlement or even to think about
particular issues, we need to find a hook to put them properly before the court. There are some such hooks, but the
fair use question isn’t one of them. There is no convincing
way to categorize that specific copyright issue as part of the
general public interest that the court is directed to take
into account in approving a settlement.
Thus, I start from a baseline of believing that the
settlement should be approved. It makes all of us better
off, and it is, in an intuitive and meaningful sense, quite
fair to all involved. I have concerns and critiques, but I see
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them as patches to make the settlement better, not as door-die clauses that the settlement must absolutely contain.
My suggestions flow from the principles identified earlier.
P R I N C I P L E 1 : T H E R E G I S T RY P O S E S
A N A N T I T R U S T T H R E AT
The basic deal embodied in the settlement—authors
and publishers who don’t opt out will receive payments out
of Google’s revenues—will create a huge administrative
workload. Someone needs to maintain a database of who
owns which copyrights, mediate in ownership disputes,
process payments, audit Google, and so on. Although
collecting societies currently do many of these jobs for
other kinds of works, such as ASCAP for musical works
and SoundExchange for sound recordings, the United
States doesn’t currently have a suitable similar organization for books. Nor can these tasks be trusted to Google,
which would have an obvious conflict of interest if it were
charged with tracking down AWOL authors or being its
own auditor. Thus, the settlement agreement establishes a
new collecting society, the Book Rights Registry.18
The Registry doesn’t just have ministerial tasks,
though. It also has substantial authority to negotiate on
behalf of authors and publishers. It has approval power
over the security standards that Google and the various
libraries must create and live by.19 It has broad discretion
to work out an equitable formula for dividing revenues
among publishers and authors.20 It can even negotiate the
terms of new revenue models (e.g., print-on-demand, PDF
downloads, and coursepacks).21
If your antitrust sensors aren’t pinging wildly at this
point, please make sure that they’re properly calibrated.
The Registry is a centralized entity with the authority to
negotiate on behalf of all registered book copyright owners. As such, it walks and quacks like a cartel. There’s a
reason that ASCAP and BMI, which play similar roles for
musical compositions, live under antitrust consent decrees;
otherwise, they could make or break radio stations and
musicians and drive up the effective price of music. Were
all authors and publishers (i.e., the plaintiff class, more
or less) to sign a piece of paper giving the Registry these
powers, it could barely lift a finger without violating the
Sherman Act. That fact doesn’t change just because the
agreement is the result of a class action settlement rather
than a meeting in the world’s largest smoke-filled room.
The settlement recognizes this danger, and accordingly puts some very important limits on the Registry. It’s
specifically prohibited from representing any subgroup
of copyright owners; it has to act in all their interest.22
(This restriction keeps it from being used by one group
of authors, say, to suppress the market for another group’s

books.) Similarly, its board is equally divided between
authors and publishers, with any action requiring a
majority.23
Further, the settlement ensures that the licenses that
copyright owners grant to participate are non-exclusive;
they can strike side deals with anyone they like.24 They’re
guaranteed more than two years to decide whether to
remove their books from the program entirely.25 Even after
that, they can opt out of almost everything beyond basic
searchability, in which Google will tell users what page of
a book contains a search term, but won’t show them any
of the actual text around the term’s appearance on that
page.26 Even within the Consumer Purchase system, individual copyright owners are always free to set the price for
e-books sold through Google.
These facts keep the Registry from acting like a classic
price-fixing cartel; individual publishers can easily defect
and charge less (or more). It’s true that the Registry could
facilitate coordination, but that’s not a big issue in the
publishing industry. Publishers can already see what each
others’ suggested prices are by looking on Amazon.
The Registry, however, will be an anticompetitive
threat for the same reason that this lawsuit will transform
publishing: the settlement’s class-binding effect. If Google
would like to negotiate, say, an encryption standard and
DRM terms for book downloads, without the Registry, it
needs to negotiate one-on-one with authors and publishers. But the Registry is authorized to negotiate on their
behalf, all of their behalf. It could agree with Google on a
privacy-intrusive DRM standard that fed back usage information into a database used to do industry-wide pricefixing in the guise of price discrimination. Other examples
abound; the Registry’s centralized negotiating role permits
various anti-competitive practices to be coordinated and
laundered. What should we do about these risks?
•

•

Antitrust consent decree. The Registry should be
under ongoing antitrust supervision from the day of
its birth. The Department of Justice (DoJ) should
require that it negotiate and sign an antitrust consent decree. That decree would enumerate various
forbidden anticompetitive practices, including those
called out in the settlement, ones pertaining to hidden price-fixing, and whatever else the experts in the
Antitrust Division think necessary to add. In addition, the DoJ should be given the authority to review
all contracts entered into by the Registry and reject
any with anticompetitive effect.
Nondiscrimination among copyright owners. For
understandable but regrettable jurisdictional reasons, the plaintiff class doesn’t include owners of
unregistered copyrights, nor does it include future
13
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•

authors. Only currently registered copyright owners
are part of the lawsuit, which means that only they
can be part of the settlement.27 The most immediate
danger is that the Registry might adopt policies that
operate to the benefit of past authors and against
future authors (policies with narrow views of fair use
and broad views of a derivative works right come to
mind). There’s an easy way out, which is that the
Registry must be explicitly required to represent any
copyright owners who agree to its standard deal and
explicitly forbidden from offering non-plaintiff and
future copyright owners any materially different deal.
This pair of rules guarantees to anyone who comes
along in the future effectively the same opt-out right
that the settlement class enjoys, while offering them
exactly the same terms if they choose not to opt out.
This way, the Registry will truly be a fair, impartial
representative of all authors and publishers.
Library and reader representation at the registry.
Beyond that, the Registry’s structural protections
should be supplemented to include voices from
outside the publishing industry. It’s acceptable and
understandable for the Registry’s charter to require
that at least one author representative and at least
one publisher representative consent to any action
that it takes, but that veto principle doesn’t require
that they be the only members of its board. It should
also contain members representing libraries and the
reading public. In addition to objecting if the Registry
takes anti-competitive, anti-reader actions, these
additional members would be able to monitor the
Registry’s actions, bringing important transparency to
this new quarter-ton gorilla of the book industry.

PRINCIPLE 2: GOOGLE POSES
A N A N T I T R U S T T H R E AT
The Registry isn’t the only entity that’ll have market
power as a result of the settlement. Google will too. It’ll
become the only game in town for scanning and searching
books on anything resembling this scale. Yes, it was the
only game in town on this scale before, but that was when
there was a legal threat hanging over it. Now Google will
have the legal okay to go full-steam ahead, with some
exceedingly tasty markets all to itself.
The immediate rejoinder from Google, of course, is
that these markets aren’t closed to entry. Microsoft used
to have a book-scanning program; it could have one
again. There’s nothing in the settlement to prevent anyone involved from doing side deals with others. Authors
could license Yahoo! to scan, index, and sell. The Registry
could split the take. Libraries could subscribe to Yahoo!’s
14
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version of the fire hose. The settlement just sets up a series
of deals with Google; it leaves everything else open for all
comers.
The problem with this argument is that you can’t
actually just go out and do what Google has done. One of
Google’s fair use arguments would have been the insane
transaction costs of trying to negotiate with every possible copyright claimant, particularly for out-of-print and
orphaned books. The settlement gives Google a clean
release from the transaction-cost madness. All those pesky
claims from authors who can’t be found or won’t play ball
just go away.
Consider the unappetizing options facing a would-be
competitor like Yahoo! If it goes ahead and starts doing
large-scale scanning, it’ll get sued just the way Google did,
but there’s no guarantee that the plaintiffs there would
feel any interest in settling on terms comparable to the
ones that Google got. Indeed, as long as there were potential plaintiffs out there, Yahoo! couldn’t feel safe, even if
it had struck agreements with 99 percent of them. The
others could still pull enough of copyright’s harsh remedial
levers to scotch the whole enterprise.
No, Yahoo! would need the same magic device of
the class action that Google is now taking advantage of.
Would the plaintiffs bother to organize themselves as a
class for its benefit? There’s no guarantee they would.
Yahoo! would be in the especially tricky situation of filing
a declaratory judgment action against a class of copyright
owner defendants. It’d be hard even just to pick proper
class representatives and appoint appropriate class counsel
without some kind of collusion. And once there were class
representatives, would they settle on comparable terms?
There’s no guarantee of it, especially given the guaranteed
good deal that they’re getting from Google.
I’ve also heard floated the idea that competitors are
perfectly free to lobby Congress on orphan works legislation. So they are, but the argument that lobbying is an
acceptable substitute for free competition in the book
market as it currently exists is laughable. If I manufacture
widgets and my competitor is monopolizing the widget
market, it’s no answer to my pleas to say that I can ask
Congress for widget subsidies. Orphan works legislation,
done right, would be a great thing. But no one should
have to count on it happening as a condition of entry to a
market that Google is already in.
Thus, Google’s first-past-the-post status here could
easily turn into a durable monopoly. That might be the
inevitable result anyway; this is a market with substantial
economies of scale and positive network effects. One may
or may not think that a book-search and distribution
monopoly built on such structural bases is legitimate; one
may or may not favor government intervention if it just so
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happens that Google is the only player in this game. I take
no position on these questions. But the court reviewing
this settlement should not set up its own power—in the
form of its ability to bind absent class members—as a barrier to entry in the online-books and book-search markets.
What, then, should the court do?
•

•

•
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No most-favored-nation clause. The most pressing
problem is that the settlement explicitly guarantees
Google a privileged position, via a most-favorednation clause in Google’s favor. For 10 years, the
Registry can’t give anyone else better “economic and
other terms” than Google gets.28 Notice, for example,
that this term would preclude the Registry from offering a better revenue-sharing deal to Yahoo! even if
the Registry thinks that this better deal is necessary
to turn Yahoo! into a serious competitor to Google.
This clause alone might be enough to deter any other
serious entry. Google’s concern about being undercut
is real, but provided that the Registry itself is under
proper antitrust scrutiny (see above), it has nothing
legitimate to fear. The most-favored-nations clause
should be struck.
Competitors offered the same deal as Google. Any
other entity willing to assume the same payment and
security obligations that Google assumes in the settlement should be allowed to offer the same services
that Google will, or any subset of them. This kind of
competition is fair to authors and publishers because
the various payment and security terms are already
presumably acceptable to them. It’s fair to Google,
which gets the same deal it currently does. It’s fair
to competitors, who could enter on a level playing
ground, without needing to roll the dice on invoking
the legal system’s power to intervene. And it saves
the legal system the work of having to deal with the
Microsoft Book Search lawsuit, the Yahoo! Book
Search lawsuit, the Facebook Book Search lawsuit,
and so on.
Registry authority to negotiate with Google
competitors. The previous rule suffices for the services
the settlement describes, but there are also the new
business models, which can’t be specified in detail
precisely because they don’t exist yet. Under the proposed settlement, the Registry can give its blessing to
Google on plenty of projects; it should be allowed to
give the same blessing to anyone else. Crucially, that
blessing would have the same effect of binding all
authors and publishers to the deal it strikes. Again,
authorizing the Registry to do such things is fair
because copyright owners could still opt out of any
new uses.29 Once the Registry did bless a project—by

•

Google or by a competitor—the previous rule would
kick in and require that the new project license be
available to anyone on nondiscriminatory terms.
Beware a scanning monopoly. If Google remains the
dominant player in actually scanning books, we ought
to be concerned about steps that it takes to preserve
or extend that monopoly.30 This concern is especially
acute for public-domain books, which ought not to
be under anyone’s exclusive control. Google’s Web
search engine has the right model: It returns results
from Google-run sites alongside results from sites run
by others. Google’s book search engine should be
similarly ecumenical and treat book scans put online
by others on an evenhanded basis. Google should also
be prohibited from using its terms of service to put
copyright-like terms-of-service restrictions on what
others do with its public-domain scans.31 In the opposite direction, Google’s collection of public-domain
books should be open to other search engines.

PRINCIPLE 3: CONSUMERS
N E E D P R OT E C T I O N
Despite being the product of a lawsuit in which the
reading public isn’t directly represented, the proposed
settlement often takes the public interest seriously. Many
clauses in it aren’t strictly necessary to resolve the dispute
between the parties to the lawsuit but nonetheless go a
good way toward making sure that the results will provide
books to the public on fair terms:
•

•

•

•

Google specifically promises that it won’t use pop-up
or pop-under ads, and the Registry is also authorized
to take swift action to opt authors out of having
their books shown with “animated, audio or video
advertisements.” 32
In providing the Institutional Subscription, Google
guarantees that its terms and conditions will “not
prohibit any uses . . . that would otherwise be permitted under the Copyright Act.”33 This is significant;
it’s a commitment that the subscriptions won’t require
readers to surrender their fair use rights, for example.
Similarly, the Institutional Subscription will never
offer an “experience and rights” worse than those
enjoyed by readers who purchase e-books through the
program,34 and copyright owners won’t be allowed to
sell out-of-print books while excluding them from the
Institutional Subscription.35
Colleges and public libraries will receive free computer terminals with complete access to the Institutional
Subscription.36 The service is stingy by default: Fouryear colleges will receive one terminal per 10,000
15
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students, and public libraries one per building. Google
isn’t even obligated to provide the service at all.
(There’s authority for Google and the Registry to
expand this program, but it’s unclear that the Registry
would ever approve more generous terms.)
Various provisions of the Copyright Act operate in
favor of libraries and other public-service entities,
and the settlement makes sure that those promises
remain intact. Libraries that allowed their books to
be scanned get back digital copies, which they can
use for accessibility purposes and to replace damaged
or lost copies of physical books.37
•

These provisions are all to the good. There are, however, other consumer-protection matters on which the
settlement is silent or ambiguous. Google insists on its
good intentions in many of these areas. (”Don’t be evil,”
and all that.) I would prefer to see stronger protections
than Google’s continued promises of non-evilness. It’s in
the nature of such assurances that they’re still offered long
after they’ve ceased to be true. To the extent that Google
really means to abide by them, it should have no objection
to putting these terms explicitly in the settlement agreement or in an FTC consent decree.
•

•

16

No price discrimination. The pricing structure for the
Institutional Subscription will be largely fair. (Google
will set pricing on an FTE basis with different pricing buckets for different categories of institutions, for
example, higher education, corporate, government,
etc.38) For individual buyers, either booksellers can
pick a price, or they can let Google’s algorithms set a
price for them based on buying patterns.39 The settlement doesn’t explicitly say that Google won’t charge
different readers different prices for the same book,
something that its immense computational power
and huge pricing corpus might make dangerously
attractive. Google has no current plans to do so, and
it’s true that the market punished Amazon harshly
when it tried the same stunt a few years back, but still.
Better safe than sorry.
Reader privacy. Your choice of reading matter ought
to be highly private. There’s a real concern that
Google could identify and track readers, page by page,
minute by minute. Indeed, the security standard that
Google must comply with requires it to keep extensive logs of user activity.40 Similarly, libraries that
open their digital copies for scholarly and classroom
uses must “keep track of and report[] all such uses
of Books to the Registry.”41 The only explicit privacy protections in the settlement, though, are about
keeping private the information that the Registry has
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about copyright owners.42 That’s insufficient. The
settlement should contain explicit privacy guarantees that user information and reading habits should
be monitored only to the minimal extent necessary
for billing, auditing, and security; that no such data
be used for any other purpose, that all such data be
promptly destroyed when no longer needed; that
Google not reveal any information about any user
or users’ reading habits to any other entity, including
the Registry; and that Google be legally responsible
for any security breaches resulting in third-party
access to reader information.
Reasonable terms and conditions. The settlement
should protect reader rights under the Copyright
Act across the board. There’s a good first cut at such
language in the settlement already. Google promises
reasonable terms and conditions for the Institutional
Subscription, specifically that it will “not prohibit
any uses . . . that would otherwise be permitted under
the Copyright Act.”43 Similarly, the Library-Registry
agreements should contain explicit statements that
library terms of service will not require readers to give
up any of their other rights under the Copyright Act.
Any new business models should come with the same
protections, as well.

PRINCIPLE 4: PUBLIC GOODS
S H O U L D B E W I D E LY AVA I L A B L E
The Google Book Search project would be impossible
without some crucial bibliographic databases. A pile of
scans is useless unless it’s linked to a database of publication metadata. Since only out-of-print books will be
previewable by default, Google needs a database telling
it which books are in and out of print.44 To convey copyright-owner requests to Google and to convey payments
from Google to them, the Registry will need a database of
book copyright ownership. Some of these databases exist
already; some will be built or supplemented as part of the
project.
These databases are all public goods. They’ll be useful to readers and researchers. They’re also going to be
immensely useful to players in the book business. The
in-print database will help libraries understand their rights
under copyright law; the rights-owner database will help
publishers gather the rights that they need to publish new
and exciting editions.
Moreover, these databases are byproducts of the
Google Book Search project, not its goals. Google isn’t
compiling them because it can make money selling access
to the databases. Instead, it’s compiling them because it
can’t offer Book Search without them. Whether or not
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Google (or the Registry) can monetize these databases
directly won’t substantially affect the incentive to compile
them.
Taken together, these propositions imply that these
databases should be opened to broad public access. That’s
exactly the policy that the settlement takes with the
Books Database—Google’s list of books it has or plans to
scan—which is required to be online and searchable.45 The
same policy should be adopted wherever else possible.
That’s not everywhere. I’m informed that Google has
assembled its database of bibliographic metadata about
publication largely by licensing it from other sources.
Scholars may contest whether such databases should be
capable of exclusive licensing, but even those who want to
pick that fight shouldn’t pick it here. Google didn’t generate this data; it shouldn’t be forced to reveal it.
The correct principle, instead, is that to the extent that
Google and the Registry create new and useful metadata
databases as part of the Book Search project, those databases should be offered to the public, gratis, and without
legal or technical restrictions. The settlement agreement
contemplates at least two such databases, both important
(though the principle might also apply to others).
•

•
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Publicly available in-print information. Consider
first the database of in-print information that Google
needs to decide whether works are “commercially
available” and thus restricted by default. Google currently synthesizes this information from a variety of
sources (such as looking at used book sales online).46
Google is required by the settlement to make this
information available to the Registry on behalf of
copyright owners;47 it should be required to make
the database public, as well. This isn’t likely to be a
practical problem, since Google will all but inevitably
expose this information when it lets users either see
preview pages or not. But still, Google shouldn’t be
given the option to restrict its availability; in case
Google does wind up having competitors in this
space, there will be an inevitable temptation to cut
off access as a way of slowing down the other guy.
Publicly available copyright ownership information.
There’s also the database of information about copyright claims that the Registry will need to use to
distribute payments among copyright owners. The
Registry is required to share much of this information
with Google;48 it should be required to share almost
as much of the copyright-owner database with the
public. There are privacy concerns here, since it will
contain information about authors, but those concerns can be accommodated without much limiting
the usefulness of the database in solving orphan works

•

problems. Pseudonyms and proxies are reasonable,
provided that the database in general is made available so that others can use it as a point of contact in
finding copyright owners or in verifying that no one
knows who the owner is or where she can be found.
Best practices for open access. In making these
databases available and in providing some of the
other core services (the exact set to be determined),
Google should be required to use standard APIs and
open data formats, as well as to allow programmatic
access and bulk download where appropriate. Google
currently does this as a matter of policy in many of
its other lines of business, and it’s already providing
PDF downloads of public-domain books. These good
policies should be enshrined as actual requirements.
Among other things, they’ll ensure that Google’s
competitors behave reasonably, too.

P R I N C I P L E 5 : AC C O U N TA B I L I T Y
A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y M AT T E R
Google has been repeatedly criticized by scholars
and activists upset at its lack of institutional transparency. It’s also learned from that criticism. The settlement
agreement contains some reassuring provisions to provide
accountability. As good as they are, they should be supplemented with a few more.
Institutionally, Google and the Registry are given
mutual rights to audit each others’ relevant books.49 While
these audits are themselves confidential, the arrangement creates a healthy system of mutual accountability.
Similarly, research users and libraries are subject to security audits under suitable procedures.50 When there are
disputes about public-domain or in-print status, they’re
subjected to a low-stakes initial process that lets the parties sort out the facts.51 Larger disputes go first through
executive-level mediation and then arbitration, on reasonably balanced terms.52
Google has also accepted a fairly stringent set of rules
that prohibit it from altering the texts of the books that
it scans. There are the usual, sensible carve outs: Google
can hyperlink indices, it can link from books to sources
they cite, it can highlight user search queries, and it can
even add a limited social-networking annotation-sharing
feature.53 These are specific exceptions, however, from the
general principle that it won’t change one word of the
author’s writings without permission.54 Good.
Google has even agreed to procedures that limit its
editorial discretion to exclude books from being displayed.
If Google removes a book for “editorial reasons,” it will tell
the Registry about it and give the Registry a digital copy of
the book.55 The Registry may then go out and commission
17

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N E T L AW

a competitor to provide the display services that Google
has refused to.56 Google believes it has a First Amendment
right not to be required to “speak” by passing along a book
that it strongly objects to, and it’s chosen an honorable
and speech-friendly way of exercising that right. Google’s
waiver does not censor the book itself, which can still be
made available through other means.
There are, however, some potential accountability
holes in this system. One is that the Registry need not,
or might not be able to, find a replacement for Google.
I’m reluctant to intervene too strongly here, particularly
when no other potential partner is willing to step forward.
Others, bolder than I, might propose a positive duty on
the Registry’s part, but I take no position on the issue,
noting only that it raises difficult issues of free speech law
and free speech policy. Fortunately, other potential holes
are easier and less controversial to close.
•

•

•
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No secret censorship. If Google de-lists a book and
the Registry doesn’t or can’t engage a replacement,
the book will genuinely vanish from this new Library
of Alexandria. Perhaps that should happen for some
books, but decisions like that shouldn’t be made in
secret. When Google chooses to exclude a book for
editorial reasons, it should be required to inform the
copyright owner and the general public, not just the
Registry. This path leaves intact Google’s option to
be silent, but requires that it be exercised with transparency. If and when Google chooses not to speak,
it should own the ethical consequences, rather than
being able to hide from its decision to hide a book.
Clear definition of non-editorial exclusion. The
settlement contains no clear distinction between
“non-editorial” and “editorial” reasons for Google to
exclude a book from being displayed. This ambiguity raises the possibility that Google might exclude
a book for editorial reasons but tell no one, not
even the Registry, about it, and thereby completely
suppress the book. There’s a danger of line-crossing
wherever a line is drawn, but assuming that Google
will act in good faith, a sharper definition of “noneditorial reasons” should suffice. The current draft of
the settlement says “quality, user experience, legal, or
other non-editorial reasons,” an unclear and imprecise list that could easily be converted into a clear and
precise one.
Accurate scanning. Under the settlement, Google
can’t “intentionally alter” the text of the books that
it scans,57 but it doesn’t promise anything about the
quality of the digitization process itself. Unfortunately,
scanning mistakes have left some of its digital books
all but unreadable.58 Google should be required to
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institute a review program that would take reports of
distorted or mutilated digital versions, respond with
reasonable speed, and rescan the books if necessary
(and allowed by the owner of the physical copy).
Other scanning institutions. One last point of
accountability concerns an issue raised by Jean-Noël
Jeanneney: What books are scanned and in the collection at all? 59 Jeanneney’s specific concern—a lack
of Francophone sources—has an easy and obvious
response: The Bibliothèque nationale de France, of
which he is the president, could join with Google to
scan its collections. Indeed, Google has indicated its
broad willingness to partner with libraries interested
in scanning large corpuses of books to get them into
the digital collection more quickly. Once again,
Google’s sensible policy is one thing in the context
of a private Google project and another in the context of a massive remaking of the US system of book
copyrights that requires the blessing of a court of law.
So long as Google is the only serious player in book
scanning and search, any institution that wishes to
provide books for scanning, or to perform scanning
itself, should be allowed to take part in the scanning
effort and ensure that particular works are digitized.
There will need to be appropriate provisions about
capacity, financing, quality control, and so on, but
a well-drafted consent-not-to-be-unreasonably-withheld clause can take care of many of them. Once
again, it’s worth emphasizing that this provision, like
all of the others, would apply both to Google and to
any of its competitors who come in under the modified settlement.

CONCLUSION
The starting point for my analysis has been that
Google and the copyright owners are asking a federal
court to put the US judicial power behind a document
that they have presented to it. The court’s consent should
not be given lightly; the settlement should be approved
only when the court is satisfied that it really will serve the
interests of all parties, including the public. I have tried to
offer general principles to think through what the public
interest requires, along with specific, realistic recommendations to implement those principles.
At the same time, this is not a sentencing hearing
or a legislative chamber. The court is not in a position to
rewire Google and the book industry to right all wrongs
therein, nor should it try. Google’s other ventures are not
on the table; nor are the many other problems bedeviling copyright law. My recommendations respond to the
specific question that the court faces: Should it use its
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power to bind absent class members and approve this
settlement?
Thus, I hope that my recommendations all have
two things in common. Each takes off from some issue
specifically raised by the proposed settlement, some way
in which approving the settlement could cause trouble
down the line. Each then offers a change to head off that
trouble, a change more or less narrowly tailored to the
issue it confronts.
How do we get there from here? The parties can’t
settle the case without the court’s approval, but the court
can’t just rewrite the settlement and impose it on them,
either. The best alternative would be for Google, the
authors, and the publishers to modify the proposed settlement along the lines that I’ve suggested and then bring
the modified version to the court for approval. None of my
recommendations touches the basic deal at the heart of the
settlement or seeks to impose terms that the parties should
find onerous.
We don’t need to depend on the parties’ good graces,
however. Some of the concerns that I’ve discussed can
easily be raised by members of the plaintiff class as part
of an objection to the fairness of the settlement to them.
Authors have a particular interest in not having their
work unaccountably excluded from Google Book Search,
for example. They should enter objections to the settlement unless it’s modified. Amicus briefing on some of
these issues could help the court put the settlement in
context, as would intervention by some of the many interested non-parties.
Even if the court is unwilling to fit all of these issues
into the copyright dispute before it, there are other legal
avenues open. The DoJ could open an investigation into
the antitrust issues and the Federal Trade Commission
into the consumer-protection ones. It matters less that
these recommendations be embodied in the settlement
than that they be enshrined somewhere enforceable, and
consent decrees are a perfectly reasonable alternative.
Potential competitors in book-scanning can also raise
many of these issues, for example, by way of a private
antitrust suit; Microsoft, which previously had a bookscanning project, would be a natural plaintiff.
My goals here are pragmatic. I’m not proposing to take
public control of the Book Search project. In comparison
with the institutional reconfiguration of book copyright
law that the settlement would enact, these tweaks are all
quite minor. Nor am I proposing to leave Book Search
entirely alone; the parties gave up on that possibility when
they asked the court to approve this sweeping class-action
settlement.
I hope that these recommendations will prove equally
appealing to those who think that Google can do no evil

and those who think that it does only evil. Perhaps they’ll
prove equally frustrating. I offer them not as criticisms of
the settlement, but refinements of it. As the chess adage
goes, “When you see a good move—wait—look for a
better one!”
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